ABSTRACT. We present a simple yet fully rational general equilibrium model that highlights the fact that relative wealth concerns can play a role in explaining the presence and dynamics of financial "bubbles." Because our model has a finite horizon, our explanation for the existence of bubbles is distinct from typical models of bubbles.
Introduction
In this paper we present a stylized model that highlights the fact that relative wealth concerns may play an important role in explaining the presence and dynamics of financial "bubbles" and excess volatility. The role of relative wealth concerns in explaining these phenomena is quite simple. In standard models rational agents exploit price anomalies by selling overpriced assets and buying undervalued assets. This activity of "buy low / sell high" eliminates price distortions in equilibrium. However, if agents are sensitive to the wealth of others, trading against the crowd increases the risk of their relative wealth. As a result, rational traders may sustain prices that are too high even though they understand that these prices deviate substantially from fundamentals.
Thus, relative wealth concerns help support the existence of bubbles by increasing the risk of trading against the crowd. We show in addition that when relative wealth concerns are sufficiently strong, they can promote the creation of price bubbles. In this case, starting from optimal risk-sharing, a small deviation by one agent may induce other agents to deviate such that the aggregate response leads to an amplification of the original deviation. As a result, optimal risk-sharing will not be stable, and asset price distortions will emerge in all stable equilibria.
While the standard assumption in economic models is that utility is derived from the absolute level of one's own consumption, economists have long believed that relative considerations are important. Indeed, Veblen (1899) argued that as society becomes richer, the amount of consumption necessary to maintain one's social standing -an important component of utility -increases. Frank (1985) has also emphasized the important of relative wealth in determining social status. More recently, such features have been incorporated in asset pricing models such as Abel's (1990) "catching up with the Joneses" utility specification.
2 All these papers assume that utility functions are such that other people's wealth or consumption levels impact one's own utility through an exogenous dependence of the utility function on relative wealth.
One limitation of assuming an exogenous preference for relative wealth is that choosing the functional form provides many degrees of freedom. We show that the relative wealth effects that are necessary to create and sustain price bubbles can also arise endogenously in a fully rational model in which agents care only about their own consumption. In particular, if there are scarce goods whose prices increase with the wealth of investors, then agents' abilities to consume will depend on their relative wealth. These relative wealth concerns can induce herding that has an aggregate impact on equilibrium prices. 3 We consider a simple finite horizon overlapping generations model. 4 In this model, the "scarce goods" are future investment opportunities. When the wealth of middle-age investors is high, competition for these investments drives down equilibrium returns, raising the cost of funding their retirement. Thus, relative wealth concerns emerge for these agents. As a result, when young, agents will wish to invest in assets that highly correlated with the investments of others in their cohort. This desire can lead agents to herd into an asset class, raising its price and lowering its future return.
The model is presented in Section 2. It is standard with the following features. First, there is no information asymmetry and the horizon is finite. Second, agents are fully rational and maximize a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function over their own consumption. Third, agents are endowed with and trade two financial assets: a risk-free annuity that pays one unit each period, and a risky security that pays either two units or zero units with equal likelihood each period.
When the risk security is in zero net supply, there is a natural and obvious equilibrium for the above setting: the risk security is not traded, and has a price equal to the price of the risk-free annuity. Indeed, in a standard complete markets model this price is the only price consistent with the absence of aggregate risk in this economy, and we therefore 3 Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1992, 2001 ) develop an alternative model of endogenous relative wealth effects. In their models, individuals compete for mates, and their success depends upon their relative wealth. This non-market competition over mates has a similar effect as the market competition over scarce resources that occurs in our model. They consider the implications of relative wealth concerns for portfolio choice and investment rates. Becker, Murphy, and Werning (2005) develop a model relative wealth effects based on individual preferences for status that is acquired through purchases of a "status good." They assume that status increases an agent's marginal utility of consumption, and show how this leads to excessive risk-taking in equilibrium. Neither paper considers the effect on asset price dynamics. 4 We choose a finite horizon to avoid the well-known possibility of bubbles in infinite horizon OLG models, which occur for a much different reason.
refer to it as the "fundamental" price. One might expect that this would be the unique equilibrium in this setting.
We show, however, that bubble-like price dynamics can arise in equilibrium in this economy. Specifically, not only can prices of the risky security deviate substantially from their fundamental value, but as long as a deviation persists it is in fact amplified over time until it suddenly collapses. These price dynamics occur despite the fact that the horizon is finite and agents are rational and use backward induction in solving their respective portfolio choice problems.
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In a striking representative example of the equilibrium we present, the price of the risky security rises to an 80% premium over the price of the risk-free annuity while it continues to dividends, with this premium vanishing as soon as a dividend is missed.
The driving force behind this seemingly odd behavior is endogenous relative wealth concerns. Agents realize that the wealth of their cohort will drive up future asset prices and thus lower their returns. Thus, to meet any given level of retirement income, agents need to save more when their cohort is wealthy. This externality induces a herding incentive: agents choose to imitate the portfolio choices of their cohort to avoid being poor when their cohort is wealthy. As a result, young investors may herd into the risky asset, driving up its price. The price distortion grows over time since as the young become wealthier, their impact on asset prices grows, further strengthening the herding incentive.
We also show that when there is aggregate risk in the economy (i.e., the risky security security is in positive net supply), then as long as agents are more risk averse than log utility, there is always an equilibrium in which the young investors herd and overinvest in the risky security. This overinvestment raises the price and drives down the risk premium of the risky security, to the point that for typical parameters the risk premium becomes negative. 5 As agents in our model are completely rational, one could argue that the equilibrium we describe is not a bubble. Since our objective is to highlight the importance of relative wealth concerns, we remain agnostic as to what constitutes the exact definition of a bubble. In any case, the equilibrium we describe clearly exhibits what we view as bubble-like behavior.
Section 3 demonstrates how these factors may even affect a simple deterministic saving/consumption pattern in a finite horizon overlapping generation model, with no discounting. We choose a constant endowment structure so that there exists a simple benchmark equilibrium in which agents' consumption is one unit per period, and in which the gross interest rate is equal to one. However, we show that there exists another equilibrium in which interest rates are higher than one and are increasing over time. As with the stochastic case, prices deviate from fundamentals due to endogenous relative wealth concerns, even though agents are risk averse and rational, and the horizon of the economy is finite. Furthermore, as we add more periods the deterministic price distortions become more pronounced over time. In the limit, the equilibrium outcome converges to a steady-state equilibrium of an infinite horizon OLG model. The prices in the steady state deviate from the benchmark but this is not due to a fiat money effect. As our analysis demonstrates, this equilibrium is the limit of equilibria in models with a finite horizon.
In section 4 we discuss an alternative approach that may yield a similar price outcome.
Rather than deriving an indirect utility in which relative considerations arise as a pecuniary effect, we can inject relative consumption considerations directly into the utility function. This captures the fact that agents care directly about what others consume. We refer to this approach as an exogenous specification of relative utility.
With either exogenous or endogenous relative utility, we analyze the conditions that are required for bubble-like behavior to arise in equilibrium. Our analysis emphasizes a general equilibrium approach. We show that there are two key requirements. First, relative wealth concerns must be sufficiently strong. Second, there is sufficient heterogeneity across agents' preferences. If agents are identical, a representative agent characterization will prevail and prices will be determined by aggregate fundamentals. In our setting, agents can be separated into distinct communities based on their preferences; in the overlapping generations setting a community is an age cohort. Because of different herding incentives, these communities trade with each other, breaking the link between aggregate consumption and asset prices. However, we show that "Keeping up with the Joneses" preferences within each community are not sufficient to sustain herding in equilibrium, and derive a more stringent necessary condition.
Related Literature
This paper is related to several strands of the literature. First the paper is related to the literature that examines relative wealth concerns. See, for example, Frank (1985) . In the finance literature, Abel (1990) was the first to introduce relative considerations in his paper on "catching up with the Joneses." His exogenous preferences approach was the basis for Gali (1994) , who analyzes the potential impact of consumption externalities on the equity risk premium. Our approach is somewhat closer to Gali's as agents care about consumption relative to current, as opposed to lagged, aggregate consumption per capita.
We differ from this literature in that we examine how relative consideration can arise endogenously and in our focus on bubble like behavior in financial markets.
The mechanism leading to herding in our model differs from papers in which herding incentives in investment are an outcome of managers' concerns about their reputation.
For example, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) show that when a manager's ability is ex-ante unknown, then he may choose to follow the actions of other managers.
There is an extensive literature on bubbles in financial markets. We clearly do not have the space here to survey this vast literature; (see Brunnermeier (2001) for an excellent survey). Instead we just note that our model is fully rational, prices are endogenous as they are obtained by crossing demand and supply in the usual way. We do not rely on infinite horizon and/or 'fiat money.' The combination of these features is not shared by the prior literature.
From a technical perspective our analysis is related to the classic literature on incomplete markets that started with Hart (1975) . This literature has shown that with incomplete markets and multiple goods, one could expect multiple equilibria some of which are not even constrained efficient (see, for example, Stiglitz (1982) and Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) ). More closely related are models of extrinsic uncertainty, or sunspots, introduced by Cass and Shell (1983) . The equilibrium we describe in Section 2 in the absence of aggregate risk is an example of what Cass and Shell (1983) call "sunspot equilibrium." This is because prices and the allocation of resources depend on a purely extrinsic random variable -the payoff of the risk security is unrelated to fundamentals. 6 Also, with aggregate risk in the economy in Section 2, or in the purely deterministic setting of Section 3, our equilibria are no longer sunspots. In our analysis, we focus on the characterization of the price dynamics, as opposed to existence results.
Also, we demonstrate the link between relative wealth concerns and sunspots, and show how herding incentives can create price bubbles in a finite and standard economy.
Finally, our paper is related to DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer (2004) . The important difference is that the focus here is on price effects rather than portfolio choices. In
DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer (2004) , we eliminated price effects by assuming communities are symmetric. In addition, in that paper only a static model is considered.
The reason for this focus was the desire to obtain a simple closed form solution and concentrate on the implications for portfolio choice. Here we analyze a dynamic model in which we can examine price effects and bubble like behavior, though the cost is that we must rely in many cases on numerical solutions.
A Model of Speculative Bubbles
We describe a model in which agents support prices that deviate substantially from "aggregate fundamentals" despite the fact that they know the bubble is unlikely to persist.
Two important features of our model are that it has finite horizon and that there is no asymmetric information.
We use a variant of a finite overlapping generations model for our analysis. There are three dates (0, 1, 2) and three types of agents: Middle-aged (M) agents live at dates 0 and 1, Young (Y) agents live at dates 0, 1, and 2, and Unborn agents (U) live at dates 1 and 2. Table 1 shows the consumption good endowments of the different agent types, where "-" specifies that an agent type does not exist during a period and "0" specifies that the type exists but has no endowment. For simplicity, we assume that date 0 consumption has already occurred, so that there is no endowment at that date. 6 One distinction of our example from the typical construction of a sunspot equilibrium is that ours does not rely on randomization over multiple equilibria in the sub-game. (Though see the appendix of Cass and Shell (1983) for another example that is not a mere randomization). Of course, that literature is focused on conditions for existence of sunspots, as opposed to considering asset price distortions, as we do here. 7 The analysis would be similar, though more complicated, if we included date 0 consumption as well. (1 ) E c
To highlight the role of relative wealth considerations, we first assume all endowments are riskless, and construct a sunspot-type equilibrium in which agents take on risk that is unrelated to economic fundamentals. 8 First, we consider the basic setting with only a single round of speculative trading prior to consumption. Having established the key insights for that simpler case, we then allow multiple rounds of speculative trade and consider the resulting price dynamics.
A Single Round of Speculative Trade
Because endowments are riskless, we may distinguish two types of trading. In period 0, young and middle-aged agents engage in "speculative trade" as they are not trading to smooth consumption between them. In period 1, the young and unborn agents engage in "non-speculative" trade that facilitates inter-temporal consumption smoothing. We are interested in the possibility of an equilibrium in which speculative trade occurs.
In our model, speculative trade results from relative wealth concerns. It is the young agents in our model who are subject to these concerns. Young agents know that at date 1, they will engage in non-speculative trade with the now unborn agents, exchanging date 1 consumption for date 2 consumption. However, they will be competing with other agents in their cohort to conduct this trade. Thus, the price at which they can make this exchange will be determined by the wealth of their cohort.
To introduce the possibility of speculative trade, we allow agents to trade a risky security in addition to a risk free asset. Suppose that the probability of rain each period is 50%.
Each period, agents may trade a risky security that pays two units of consumption next period if it rains and zero if it does not; the risk free asset pays one unit with certainty.
Let p 0 denote the price of the risky security relative to the risk free asset that serves as a numeraire. With riskless endowments and risk averse agents, there exists a simple benchmark equilibrium in which there is no trade at date 0 and its equilibrium price, p 0, equals one. At date 1, young and unborn agents trade only riskless portfolios to smooth consumption across dates 1 and 2, and the price ratio remains equal to one.
We now demonstrate that there may also exist an equilibrium with speculative trade. Let R 1 denote the interest rate that prevails between dates 1 and 2. A standard derivation
shows that given R 1 , the indirect utility of a young agent with wealth w (measured in date 1 consumption units) is given by:
Naturally, this indirect utility function is increasing in R 1 --a higher interest rate makes it easier for the young to save for retirement (note that when γ > 1, utility is negative).
At date 1, we have a standard two period exchange economy, so that the equilibrium interest rate 1 R is determined by the aggregate equilibrium holdings of date 1 consumption goods by the young generation, which we denote by W Y1 , and the date 2 endowment of consumption goods (e U2 ) of the unborn agents:
That is, the equilibrium interest rate at date 1 is increasing in the aggregate consumption growth rate of the young and unborn agents. Combining (1) and (2), we conclude that the indirect utility of a young agent is given by:
Note that if then the marginal indirect utility of a single young agent is increasing in the aggregate wealth of other young agents. In this case, there is an important strategic complementarity between young agents: Each young agent prefers to have a positive correlation between his own wealth and the wealth of his cohort. This property is critical in generating the price dynamics we are interested in (see Section 4 for further discussion).
A Speculative Equilibrium
To derive the equilibrium, consider the optimal response of a single young agent to the aggregate actions of the other young agents. We examine the reaction to a speculative bias in the portfolio of the young cohort, which we denote by σ. That is, suppose young agents hold portfolios such that we compute the optimal bias for an individual young agent (assuming all other cohorts are also optimizing). We denote the optimal bias in his portfolio by m(σ). Equilibrium then corresponds to a fixed point m(σ) = σ, in which it is optimal for each individual young agent to choose the same bias as his cohort.
We derive the function m(σ) as follows. Given the aggregate trades of the young, the aggregate consumption of type M agents can be determined by market clearing. The marginal rate of substitution of these agents, together with their budget constraint, then determines the equilibrium price ratio, p 0 , and the expected consumption c that young agents can afford. Given these securities prices and the aggregate consumption of other young agents, we then evaluate the optimal portfolio choice for a single young agent.
Despite the complexity of the above procedure, we are able to demonstrate the following sufficient condition for the existence of a biased equilibrium: Proposition 1. There exists a biased equilibrium (i.e., m(σ) = σ with σ > 0 and p 0 > 1 if
e e e e e γ− ⎛ ⎞
Note that to satisfy (4), we must have γ > 2; that is, agent's must be sufficiently risk averse. In addition, e Y1 / e M1 < γ − 2, so that the young agents cannot hold too much of the date 1 consumption good. Otherwise, if the middle-age community were too small, the price impact of the young traders would be too large to support a biased equilibrium.
Finally, the condition is more easily satisfied if the endowment of the unborn is low, as a decrease in e U2 makes the price of this good more sensitive to the young cohort's wealth.
Thus, a projected demographic decline (such as the one discussed recently in the context of the crisis in the social security system) may induce a biased equilibrium. . Note that absent relative wealth concerns, the optimal response m o is decreasing in σ --if some agents are biased, it is optimal for other agents to trade against the bias. In this case the unique equilibrium is σ = 0.
Relative wealth concerns, however, mean that for low levels of bias, other agents are induced to herd and trade with the bias rather than against it, causing m to increase with σ initially. When relative wealth concerns are sufficiently strong, as in this example, a speculative equilibrium is possible. 
Stability
Under the conditions of Proposition 1, both an unbiased and a biased equilibrium exist.
However, we argue that the more natural outcome is in fact the equilibrium that exhibits price distortions. One refinement criteria that has been used in the literature is that of stability. The definition of stability relies on an iterative procedure in which agents update their strategies based on the current outcome. A stable solution has the property that if the economy is nearby, agents' best responses will move the economy closer to the equilibrium (rather than farther away). 9 If we imagine a process in which young agents gradually update their portfolios to be an optimal response to the choices of others young agents, we are lead to the following notion of stability:
Definition An equilibrium σ is locally stable if for every σ in a neighborhood of σ and , the process 0
σ . An equilibrium is globally unstable if for any and 0 k >
σ σ ≠ , the process ( ) t σ does not converge to σ .
In a one-dimensional context, stability is equivalent to the reaction function crossing the 45-degree line from above. As we can see in Figure 1 , the biased equilibrium is stable:
when σ is below the equilibrium, young agents increase their holdings of the risk security, and when σ is above the equilibrium, they reduce their holdings. The unbiased equilibrium, however, is globally unstable. This holds generally, and follows from the fact that and , as we show in the proof of Proposition 1. Hence we conclude that:
Under the conditions of Proposition 1, the unbiased equilibrium in which σ = 0 is globally unstable and the biased equilibrium is stable.
Aggregate Risk
Thus far, we have assumed all endowments are riskless. While this setting is simple, strong conditions are needed for a speculative equilibrium, and the unbiased equilibrium also exists (though it is unstable). Here we show that with a small amount of aggregate risk, an equilibrium in which young agents take excessive risk always exists and is often unique.
Suppose that the date 1 endowment of the middle-aged agents is e M1 (1 + σ 0 ) in the event of rain, and e M1 (1 − σ 0 ) in the event of no-rain, for some σ 0 > 0. Similarly, young agents have endowment e Y1 (1 + σ 0 ) and e Y1 (1 − σ 0 ) in the events of rain and no-rain, respectively. Thus, σ 0 > 0 represents the aggregate risk faced by middle-aged and young agents.
Note that both types of agents hold an equal share of the aggregate risk in proportion to their wealth. With CRRA utility, this allocation is Pareto optimal, and there would be no trade in equilibrium if there were no relative wealth concerns (that is, if the economy ended on date 1, or if the unborn could also trade at date 0). As the following proposition shows, however, with relative wealth concerns the young agents will hold excessive risk:
Proposition 3. If γ > 1, m(σ 0 ) > σ 0 , and there exists a locally stable equilibrium with m(σ) = σ > σ 0 in which the young agents hold excessive risk.
Proposition 3 shows that in the presence of aggregate risk, we no longer need condition (4) for relative wealth concerns to bias the equilibrium outcome (i.e., we no longer need restrictions on the relative wealth of the different cohorts). It is enough that γ > 1. Note that this example does not satisfy condition (4), and that absent relative wealth concerns, m o (σ 0 ) = σ 0 = 10% is the unique equilibrium. In our model, however, the unique equilibrium occurs with σ = m(σ) = 30.8%. The position of the young agents is so extreme that the middle-aged agents hold a portfolio that is negatively correlated with the aggregate market risk, with bias m o (σ) = −8.4%, which implies that the equilibrium risk premium of the risky security is negative. A negative premium associated with aggregate risk would generally be regarded as a price bubble. 
Creating Bubbles
What factors might cause bubbles to emerge in this economy? Based on our results thus far, two factors may lead to the emergence of a bubble:
A demographic change. Condition (4) implies that the likelihood of a bubble increases with the wealth of the middle-age agents relative to the young agents, as the young agents have a smaller impact on current security prices. The likelihood also increases with the wealth of the young agents relative to the unborn agents, as young agents have a larger impact on next period's investment opportunities. Thus, a change in the wealth distribution across cohorts may make the unbiased equilibrium unstable and lead to a bubble. In particular (and as we will show in the next section), an increase in the wealth of the young cohort can have a non-monotonic effect so that a bubble exists only if the wealth of the young is neither too high nor too low. As a result, bubbles might emerge or collapse as the relative wealth of the young agents fluctuates.
An increase in aggregate risk. As we have seen, the presence of aggregate risk can induce a bubble in equilibrium even when the unbiased equilibrium is stable absent aggregate risk. The intuition for this outcome is that with aggregate risk, young agents are forced to hold some of the risky security. But once they hold some of the risk, the herding effect of their relative wealth concerns induces them to hold much more of it, leading to a bubble. This effect increases with the amount of aggregate risk in the economy. Thus, an increase in aggregate risk could lead to the emergence of a bubble.
There are several other mechanisms that may also lead some young agents to hold risky portfolios and induce a herding response by the cohort:
Portfolio constraints. If some agents are constrained to hold undiversified portfolios (for example, as part of their labor income due to moral hazard), then if utility exhibits a herding incentive, these agents will "pull" other community members towards undiversified portfolios.
Differences of Opinion.
Some young agents might be overly optimistic about the fundamentals of the risky security. Once these agents buy the security, relative wealth concerns of other young agents will "pull" them to trade in the same direction as the optimistic investors. 10 Thus, rational young agents amplify the bias, instead of absorbing it, leading to emergence of a bubble equilibrium. Note that combining the instability of the unbiased equilibrium with the stability of the bubble one implies that even a very small "optimism shock" on part of a subset of the young cohort can "shift" the economy away from the unbiased equilibrium to the bubble equilibrium.
10 In a static one period model Miller (1977) argues that in the presence of short-sale constraints pessimists are sidelined from investing, so the optimist is the only marginal pricer leading to higher valuations. Harrison and Kreps (1978) were among the first to demonstrate how differences in beliefs across investors can lead to a speculative premium given an investor buys under the belief he can resell next period to someone with higher beliefs in the future. In their setup all investors face a short-sale constraint and the market price is higher than all investors' marginal valuations for the stock.
Multiple Speculative Trading Rounds
The relative wealth concerns of young agents can create distortions in the equilibrium prices of risky assets with just one round of speculative trade. We now show that with multiple rounds of speculative trade, bubble-like price dynamics can emerge.
In this equilibrium, as long as price distortions persist, they become more severe with time. The amplification along the bubbles path is due to the link between the returns of the risky assets and the wealth of the young cohort. As mentioned above, the young agents' portfolios are tilted towards the risky security. As a result, if it rains their wealth increases. However, as they become wealthier, their impact on asset prices increases, leading to a more pronounced price distortion in the following period.
Even more striking is the fact that the gains to the young agents if the bubble persists are much smaller than the losses they suffer when it bursts. To an outside observer it may seem that, in equilibrium, agents are risk loving even though they are in fact risk averse.
To introduce multiple speculative trading opportunities we partition the time interval between date 0 and date 1 into sub-periods (0, , 2 ,...., 1) N ∆ ∆ ∆= . We refer to each subperiod of length ∆ as a "day" and allow for speculative trade on each day j (time On each trading day j, agents trade two assets. Each trading day, the holder of a risk-free bond receives a claim to one unit of consumption on date 1; that is, the risk-free bond pays a dividend of one unit of consumption each period. The risky security pays a dividend each period of two units of consumption at date 1 if it rains on day j+1 and zero if it does not rain. We assume the probability that it will rain in any given day is 50% regardless of what happened in the past.
The solution method is similar but more involved than the one used in Section 2.1. Here we rely on a numerical solution using dynamic programming. As before, the basic idea is to compute the optimal portfolio choice of a young agent when we take the aggregate bias in portfolios of the young cohort on day j to be σ. All other agents are assumed to be maximizing their utilities. A fixed point of the optimal response function corresponds to an equilibrium on date j. The two graphs also show that price distortions do not occur if either the young generation or the middle-aged generation is sufficiently wealthy. Specifically, there are no distortions if either the aggregate relative wealth of the young generation is below 0.3 or above 0.85. When the relative wealth of the young agents is too high, the impact of their trades on the price of the risky security is too great to support a speculative equilibrium. When the relative wealth of the young agents is too low, the impact of their wealth on the equilibrium interest rate R 1 at date 1 is too small to support a speculative equilibrium.
We illustrate the dynamics of the model in a three period example in Figure 4 . In each node we report two numbers. The top one is the wealth of the young cohort while the In this initial day the risky security price is s not bottom one is the price of the risky asset p j .
In the first day, a young agent chooses a portfolio so that his wealth becomes 0.55 if it rains the next day and 0.16 if it does not.
1.73. If it indeed rains on the next day, so that his wealth goes up to 0.55, on the next day he chooses a portfolio that will pay 0.59 (0.16) in the following day if it rains (does not rain) the next day. In addition, the price distortion is exacerbated and the price of the risky security is now 1.76. If it does not rain then the young cohorts' wealth goes down to 0.16, and stays at 0.16 from this point till time t=1 (i.e. for the next two days). Thus, the bubble has collapsed, the price of the risky security is one thereafter, and the young agent cohort never recovers. This is a consequence of the fact that the young cohort's aggregate relative wealth needs to exceed 0.3 for a speculative equilibrium to exist.
Overall, the behavior that is illustrated in the figure is quite striking. The young generation repeatedly bets that it will rain the next day. While their wealth doe increase by much, the bubble increases due to an amplifying feedback effect along the bubbles path. If it does not rain one day, which is likely to happen, the bubble bursts. In this case the young generation is left with less than half of its original endowment.
Overall, young agents lose more than half of their wealth in seven out of eight cases. In the single case in which it rains three consecutive days they increase their wealth by only 20%. Hence, these endogenous relative considerations yield a behavior that is surprising given that all agents are risk averse. 
A Deterministic Model
In this section we briefly demonstrate how endogenous relative wealth consideration can even affect simple deterministic saving/consumption patterns in a finite horizon overlapping generations model. We then consider the steady-state as the horizon lengthens.
Finite Horizon
We consider an N-period model where the endowment structure is described below:
Apart from the first and last generation, each generation lives for three dates. We label the three periods in an agents' life cycle as young, middle-aged and old, where his endowment profile is (α,3−2α,α). The first and last generations live for only two periods and have an endowment of (2−α,α) and (α,2−α) respectively. In each date, other than the first and last ones, three cohorts coexist; in the first and last dates only two cohorts interact. The only decisions agents make each period is how much to consume and how much to save.
By construction, at each date aggregate endowment per-capita equals one. Given the endowment structure, it is evident that there exists an equilibrium in which gross interest rates equal one in every period, and all agents consume one unit per period. One might hastily conclude that this is a unique equilibrium, since agents have incentives to smooth consumption. However, we show that there exists another equilibrium in which interest rates are higher than one and are increasing over time.
Similar to the stochastic case, the solution technique is based on solving the equilibrium using a reaction function procedure. At each date, only two generations interact (young and middle-aged). The young agents realize that their cohort will trade in the future with the now unborn agents. The prices that will prevail are determined by the wealth of this unborn cohort as well as by how wealthy their own cohort will be at that time.
Specifically, the interest rate that will prevail between the time that these currently young agents are middle-aged and old is a function of the overall wealth of their cohort at that time. As a consequence, the consumption/investment decisions of these young agents are endogenously linked to the decisions of the rest of their cohort so that a herding incentive emerges and agents imitate the actions of their cohort. Given this link, similar to before, we can derive the equilibrium by considering the reaction of a single young agent to the aggregate actions of other young agents, where equilibrium is a fixed point in which an individual young agent chooses the same action as his cohort.
We solve this model numerically. The figure below displays the evolution of the gross interest rate in a finite horizon economy with 5 periods, γ of 3.5, and two values of α (0.1 solid line and 0.3 dashed line). The interest rates reported are annualized. 12 In this equilibrium, even though the endowment is risk free, the horizon is finite, and agents are risk averse and rational, interest rates are higher than one and are increasing over time.
As a result of the increasing interest rates over time, agents divert consumption to the period when they are old, and this effect becomes more pronounced as time passes. The existence of equilibrium with price distortions relies on γ being high enough and α being not too high. For example, one can show analytically that in an economy with only three dates when α = 0 we need γ to be higher than three in order to obtain a herding equilibrium. 
Infinite Horizon and Steady State
As we add more periods, the price distortions become more pronounced. However, the rate of increase in the interest rate declines. In fact, for any α>0 as we add more and more periods the equilibrium outcomes converge to a steady state equilibrium of an infinite horizon OLG model. This infinite horizon model is a direct extension of the finite horizon models, emphasizing the fact that the effect we focus on is different from standard findings in infinite overlapping generations models. Specifically, the behavior we characterize is due to herding and not fiat money.
In the infinite horizon economy, each agent in the economy has the same endowment profile (α, 3−2α, α). In a stationary equilibrium, the gross interest rate is constant and is given by R. As a result, the consumption for each agent takes the form of (c, c
). Agents live for three periods each so that in every period there are three generations who overlap. As a result, three is the total supply in each period and market clearing implies:
State prices are proportional to . Hence, using the budget constraint, the equilibrium R can be characterized by: The last observation shows that for a α close to zero we need γ to be only higher than two (compared with three in a two period model). This is consistent with the previous observation that adding more periods magnifies the herding effect. The proposition also shows that if the endowment is closer to the Pareto-efficient frontier (higher α), one needs to resort to a higher risk aversion coefficient. The graph above illustrates a comparison between a two-period model and an infinite horizon model. R 0 and R 1 denote the interest rates that arise in a two period model; R 0 denotes the interest rate between dates zero and one, while R 1 denotes the interest rate between dates one and two. As we can see, the interest rate between dates one and two is higher. Both interest rates are lower than the steady state interest rate. In the infinite horizon model the conditions needed to generate this behavior are relaxed. Both effects are consistent with our numerical findings from a finite horizon model with an increase in the number of periods.
Relative Utility
In the previous sections we examined a model in which agents cared only about their own consumption. Despite this fact, some agents were sensitive to the wealth of others. This was due to the fact that wealth of others had an impact on prices, which in turn affected consumption. This becomes clear from the indirect utility function of a single young agent we derived in section 2. Apart from his own wealth w, a young agent cares about the aggregate wealth of the young cohort, , as well: , the second type are agents who care explicitly about the consumption C of other agents of their own type:
where E is some exogenously specified constant. If we set E = e U2 then we get an equivalent model in which agents care only about one type of consumption, but explicitly care about their relative wealth. These two approaches can be described as:
Exogenous specification-explicitly assumes agents' utility depends on the consumption/wealth of others. For example, assuming a utility function of the form , where c is the agent's personal consumption and C is the average consumption of the agent's peer or reference group (which can include all agents, or just a subset). To better understand what is required from a relative utility specification to induce asset pricing distortions, we focus for the rest of this section on an exogenous specification of the form,u(c,C) where we assume that:
Assumption: The utility function u(c,C) is increasing and concave in c .
A natural property of a relative utility function is that an agent's utility is decreasing in other peoples' wealth or consumption. Dupor and Liu (2003) refer to this property as Jealousy: The agent's utility is decreasing in average community consumption, . 2 ( , ) 0 u c C < Jealousy always holds for the specification in (5). Jealousy captures the idea that agent's care about their own consumption relative to their peers. By itself, however, it does not imply that agent's will herd in their portfolio choice. For that we need a stronger property. Crowd following behavior will potentially arise if agents' marginal utility from consumption (wealth) is higher when their community's average consumption (wealth) is high. Abel (1990) KUJ preferences lead agents to herd and accentuate any biases that may exist regarding portfolio choice. However, the KUJ property by itself is not sufficient to lead to the creation of self-sustaining biases and price bubbles in which agents hold portfolios with negative risk premia. For example, consider a frictionless exchange economy, and consider the specification that is used in Gali (1994) 
In this case, when 1 γ > both jealousy and KUJ are satisfied. However, as Gali (1994) notes, this functional form leads to a unique outcome, which is identical to the outcome with a standard logarithmic utility function. One can easily generalize Gali's claim and show that it holds for any increasing concave function f.
The intuition behind Gali's result can be expressed in terms of the optimal response of an individual to the actions of the rest of his or her community. Consider the simple case in which the aggregate endowment is risk free and there are only two equally likely states.
Suppose the average consumption in the community is 100 units in one state and 150 in the other; i.e., there is herding into the second state. If an agent chooses this consumption profile, his utility is given simply by f 1 , and he avoids all relative wealth risk. But by shifting a unit of consumption to the lower state, so that his consumption profile becomes (101,149), the agent gains more relative consumption in the low state than he gives up in the high state. Hence the agent profits from this deviation. 13 In other words, individuals will choose to deviate from optimal risk sharing less than the rest of their community. In equilibrium, this unravels the herding equilibrium and implies that only optimal risk sharing can be sustained.
In a frictionless exchange economy, a standard equilibrium corresponds to the set of allocations in which agents' consumption is non-decreasing in the aggregate endowment.
The bubble equilibria we present here have the striking feature that young agents and middle-aged agents choose portfolios that are negatively correlated; and thus young agents hold risk that has a negative risk premium. We would like to know what properties of the utility function are needed for such an outcome, which we define as follows: A Non-Standard Equilibrium in a frictionless exchange economy is an equilibrium in which consumption profiles of individuals are not monotone functions of the aggregate endowment.
What does it take to support a non-standard equilibrium? With complete markets, marginal utilities of agents must be proportional to prices. Thus, marginal utilities must be monotonically related. If marginal utility is monotonic in consumption, then the consumption of each agent can be expressed as a function of aggregate consumptioni.e., only aggregate risk is held and we have a standard equilibrium.
So, a necessary condition for a non-standard equilibrium is that marginal utility is nonmonotone as we increase both individual and aggregate consumption over some range of equilibrium consumption. That is, there must be regions such that which requires γ > 2, and holds for γ > 3 and C > E. For C = e Y1 and E = e U2 , condition (6) is implied by our earlier condition (4) for the existence of a herding equilibrium without aggregate risk. The two conditions coincide if the young cohort is small (e Y1 /e M1 → 0); otherwise, condition (4) is stronger because the young agents' herding tendency must be strong enough to overcome their own impact on security prices. The weaker condition (6), however, is sufficient to guarantee an equilibrium with a negative risk premium in the presence of a small amount of aggregate risk.
Conclusion
In this paper we have demonstrated that endogenous relative wealth concerns may play an important role in explaining the presence and dynamics of financial "bubbles". We have highlighted this fact by presenting a simple stylized finite horizon fully rational overlapping generations model, in which agents care only about their own consumption.
When there are scarce goods whose price increases with the wealth of investors, then agents' ability to consume will depend on their relative wealth. This externality induces a herding incentive: agents choose to imitate the portfolio choices of their cohort to avoid being poor when their cohort is wealthy. As a result, young investors may herd into the risky asset, driving up its price. The price distortion grows over time since as the young become wealthier, their impact on asset prices grows, further strengthening the herding incentive. Other papers that have attempted to generate financial bubbles have typically been unable to create such an amplification effect of the price distortion along the bubble path.
These relative wealth concerns will have an aggregate impact on equilibrium outcomes as long as there are some frictions that prevent agents endowed with the scarce goods from completely selling their endowment in advance. In our overlapping generations model these frictions are manifested by the inability to trade securities prior to birth, thereby leading to the emergence of relative wealth concerns for older generations of consumers.
Price distortions emerge in our model despite the fact that the horizon is finite, so that agents use backward induction in solving their respective portfolio choice problems.
Financial "bubbles" exist even though agents have riskless endowments, and there is neither aggregate risk nor information asymmetry. In contrast to standard models where the activity of "buy low / sell high" eliminates price distortions in equilibrium, if agents are sensitive to the wealth of others, trading against the crowd increases the risk of their relative wealth. As a result, rational traders may sustain prices that are too high even though they understand that these prices deviate substantially from fundamentals. In fact, given the price dynamics and the portfolio allocations produced by the model, an outside observer that does not account for relative wealth considerations might be tempted to conclude that some of the agents in the model are actually risk loving.
An alternative, somewhat more behavioral preference related approach to endogenously deriving relative wealth considerations is to explicitly inject relative consumption considerations directly into the utility function. Specifically, we show that Keeping Up with the Joneses preferences are not sufficient to sustain herding in equilibrium, and derive a stronger necessary condition; The KUJ effect should dominate the agent's risk aversion (the sum of the cross derivate and second derivative should be positive). We demonstrate that for both approaches there are two key requirements that are required for relative utility considerations to lead to bubble-like price dynamics in equilibrium. First, relative utility considerations must be sufficiently strong. Second, there exists sufficient heterogeneity across agents' preferences so that agents can be separated into distinct communities based on their preferences. In equilibrium, these communities trade with each other, breaking the link between aggregate consumption and asset prices. With identical agents, a representative agent exists and in equilibrium no price distortions will arise. Combining the two approaches will strengthen the effects that we document and lead to a greater likelihood and severity of price bubbles, as might be expected.
Our focus has been on financial bubbles. Empirically there is a sense that at least some bubble-like episodes tend to occur in times when there is a potential of substantial technological innovation that has a significant level of uncertainty regarding its success.
For example, the recent internet bubble was associated with technology that was received with major enthusiasm by some and skepticism by others. The relationship between relative wealth concerns and technology bubbles is considered in DeMarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2004b) .
